The Philosophy of War & How to Establish Peace Among Nations

On the theories at play in international relations and the essential point they are all missing.

The Motherland Monument at the Kiev War Museum, Ukraine. (Photo and layering by the author.)

In a world where most of us would proclaim the wish to live in peace with each other, it is a conundrum of great and terrible importance that we fare no better in this endeavor. Despite the advanced stage of human development, we are still easy prey to the drums of war. Ignorance about the theories at play in motivating us to have a go at each other, is partly to blame. The deeper cause is to be found on a much more practical level, although no less difficult to rectify. But try we must — humanity depends upon it.

While emotion controls most people’s thinking about a major conflict between states, the thinking that controls most people’s emotions, is carried out by the few at the top. Military academies and university institutes specializing in international relations teach theories of war and international relations to educate future generals and political advisers. The same few schools of thought are spread across the globe, evenly respected by powers of otherwise differing ideology. All sides follow the same playbook.

Sun Tzu

First among the compulsory teachings comes The Art of War (originally Military Methods, approximately 500 BC). Comprised of 13 short chapters of a number of sentence-long decrees fit to be painted onto a book of bamboo strips. It was written by Sun Tzu (Master Sun, originally known as Sun Wu) who found fame as a military advisor to the King of Wu, as China was shaping up to go through the Warring States Period, which lasted about 250 years until the King of Qin unified the Chinese states and became its first Emperor.

The main categorization is that between strategy and tactics. The two are of equal importance to a successful campaign, but of very different natures.

A winning strategy needs to be a long term plan, secret, unwavering and fully calculated. The means for the calculations is knowledge about the enemy, brought about by spies, and enlightened self-knowledge in addition to the knowledge of human nature in general. The aim of calculation is to, in effect, win the war even before the first battle — at best, while avoiding battle altogether.

Tactics, on the other hand, is short term, open for all to see and ideally able to change shape in an instant. (In the constant movement and variation between the direct and the indirect ways of engagement, yin and yang are manifested as opposite dynamics within the ever moving circle of chi.)

• Be water among rocks. Change according to the circumstances and win by only advancing toward weak points, while giving way to strong points. Generals are even at liberty to act contrary to orders from the sovereign, if need be. Be like the snake in the Ch’ang mountains; it attacks with the end that you didn’t strike and with both ends in case you strike it down the middle.
• It is always better to be the one taking the initiative and being the active side, rather than the reactive side — whether acting in defense or attack, indirectly or directly. This way the enemy will be in your control.
• Prioritize your defense. It is in your own power to avoid defeat; it is not in your power whether the enemy can be defeated or not. This way the wise warlord only risks a stalemate. Keep expectations low. Do not press too hard, as in completely besieging an enemy. Unless they have an escape route, they will feel doomed and therefore lose all fear, which in turn just serves to make them that much more ferocious. Likewise, it is advantageous to put your own men in harm’s way.
• Be calm and strong like an enlightened sage. But — and here it comes — do away with virtues such as being honorable or caring. Being moral is a sin! It will make you vulnerable to shame, worry and trouble of mind; ruinous to the conduct of war.
• Another paramount principle which goes against common ethics, is the one covering both the categories of strategy and tactics in its dark web: all warfare is based on deception. Keep the strategy secret to both the enemy and your own men. Rule your army in irregular fashion to leave everyone at a loss of anticipation as to your plan and your true nature. This will make them easy to control and thus more effective. They are the body, you are the mind. Together you are one whole. Set up a strict “moral law” in order to convince your men to die for you. First treat them kindly, then strictly. A stipulated moral code is needed for the sake of discipline. Deception must prevent your people from knowing that your morals is all a scam. Confuse the enemy to the point where he doesn’t know what to defend and what to attack. If you are stuck in a desperate situation, throw something odd and unaccountable in his way. Force him to reveal himself, instead of the other way around. Disadvantage can thus be turned into advantage.

Unlike his two contemporary giants of Eastern philosophy, Confucius (Master Kong, founder of Confucianism) and Lao Tzu (Old Master, founder of Taoism), Sun Tzu preaches virtues of immorality and deception, while limiting his thinking to the subject of war.

Niccolò Machiavelli

The second classic in the studies of international relations is in many ways a European version of the 2000 year older Chinese original, although Sun Tzu was still unknown in Europe at the time. The Prince (1532) was written during the Renaissance by the military advisor to the Duke of Urbino, Italy, in times of incessant warfare involving city-states as well as foreign powers and the Church.

Introduced to the Duke as both a gift of wisdom and a job application, Machiavelli’s little book carries on with a mix of philosophy, government advise and historical examples.

• The deeper nature of humans and their world is bleak. The price for our free will and the honor it may entail lies in the relative absence of God’s will and intervention. The Church and its popes are Godless participants in the perpetual power-struggles of mankind. And Man is not kind. Rather, his nature is described in terms of egotism, cruelty, evilness, ungratefulness, indecisiveness, hypocrisy, greed, angst, fearfulness, untruthfulness, simple-mindedness, self-deceptiveness — in short, human nature is irreversibly immoral. Any ethics one might come up with is inevitably destroyed by it.
• War is therefore a natural stage in relations between centers of power. The urge to conquer is natural, so if one is able to, then one ought to. Might makes right. So does necessity, rendering the means holy. The only choice we have is that between different grades of evil. Destiny must be violently subdued, as if it were a woman… Greatness only emerges through ferocious conflicts.
• In answer to the doom and gloom of the nature of things, the ruler is, in effect, advised to loose his moral ideals and become an immoral realist whose only interest is war. In an evil world, success comes to whose who are best at being evil.
• Never count on the unreliable love of your people; count only on the fear that you install in them. Fear is controllable. But always avoid their hate (by not stealing their property or their women).
• Be cruel to begin with and kind during the later stages of a campaign. Charity is destructive. The more you do it, the less you will be able to do it in the future. And helping your fellow man will only result in your own relative downgrading. Only give away what does not belong to you.
• Let the neutral court carry out the punishing, while you give the rewards.
• Divide and rule. Control a potential adversary by splitting it into conflicting parties.
• Be fox — be lion. There are two kinds of weapons: the law, which is characteristically human, and the brutal power, which belongs to the category of animals. When the former is rendered ineffective, one must turn to the latter. Hence, the ruler must inhabit both human and animal nature. Be strong and brave like a lion. But no less like a fox, which involves qualities of deception and untruthfulness, as well as being cunning and having no shame. Virtues are harmful, only making you weaker, but very useful when used as a pretense. And lying to the people is justified by the fact that they would soon do the same against you. Most important of all the faked virtues, is the fear of God. The mobs are easily fooled by looks, and mobs are the only thing really existing in this world.

Contrary to the idealism promoted by most of the Greek philosophers who were reinstalled and admired during the Renaissance, Machiavelli represents a stark realism. It not only concerns the act of war and governance, but indeed the whole nature of the world and it’s human beings. It may be a world created by God, but it is an immoral mess in which all we can do is to fight our way toward the top, by keeping as many as possible under foot. What we see is what we have. And regulative principles of good or evil behavior are nowhere to be seen.

Thomas Hobbes

A further expansion on the immoral state of nature and what to do about it, is the topic of Leviathan (1651), written by the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (who also had a short spell of teaching math to the exiled Charles, Prince of Wales, later known as King Charles II.)

• He describes how the natural state of human interaction is devoid of any justice, rights or property. It is a world of every man against each other, where the lack of anyone’s dominating superiority creates a constant state of fear. What does exist, is a natural right to use any means available in order to preserve one self in the perpetual struggle against others. The state of nature is a state of war between individuals.
• Only through reason do we find a way out. Peace can be attained through mutual contracts in a political society, when enough individuals realize that respecting other people’s rights works both ways and is in fact in one’s own personal interest. A clever egotist will want to give up sovereignty and become a collaborative member of a greater structure: the state (Leviathan). Using the name of a biblical sea monster, implies that this instrument of peace for mankind is none the less constituted by beastly might. It needs a ruthless ruler and a strong army. (It is worth noting that this idea was part of Chinese philosophy since some 1800 years earlier, when Emperor Qin united “all under Heaven,” as described in the myth depicted in the film Hero (2002) by Zhang Yimou.)

Human reason, then, is the foundation of morality and peace, while animals follow only the law of the jungle. The philosophy of war has found a political way to peace among men. So why are we still at it? Because individual states in the realm of international relations are still left to act like beasts in the jungle.

Although humanity has built impressive structures of state, whose social contracts have been incredibly effective in their internal drive for values such as peace, stability, equality and liberty, compared to the horror of Hobbes’ state of nature, it is unfortunately completely the opposite situation regarding the external relations between those same states. Where states are constructed of hierarchy, between them is only anarchy. National governments lack the stronger political structure above them, which could force them to respect each other’s rights and, as in the case of individual humans within a state structure, better secure their own interests. The best each state can do, is to concentrate on self-preservation and fight by any means available, heeding the principle that its national interests justify the means (raison d’état). The state of nature of international relations is so far no different from Hobbes’ state of nature of individuals. It is a world of every state against each other. Devoid of any moral constraints. A constant war for world power fought using both diplomacy and military. Kissinger has been excellent at it.

Henry Kissinger

Modern thinking on the subject of war and international relations owes a great deal to the American diplomat, Henry Kissinger. Born to a Jewish-German family in 1923 as Heinz, he fled the Nazis and later returned as part of the invading US forces. Since the late 60’s he has been a very influential voice in US foreign policy, holding several posts in the Nixon and Ford administrations, as well as in his later roles as advisor to businesses and governments.

His masterpiece was the 1972 opening up to communist China. In a textbook example of Machiavellian divide and rule tactics, Kissinger’s negotiations allowed America to insert a split in between the major communist powers of USSR and China. Betraying the US promises to the capitalist allies in Taiwan was just part of the bigger game, as ideological values have no say at the end of the day.

In Diplomacy (1994), Kissinger recounts his lifework and advocates a balanced stand in the idealist-realist debate. He describes an evolution of world order, developing from the rivalry of European empires to the current American superpower status.

• The major European powers were locked in a spiral dynamics between imperialist efforts to take over the entire world and the efforts to create a balance of power in between them; each succeeding the other when one effort turned out to be unsuccessful. Both are aspects of realism: winning by stepping on top of everyone else, or resigning to the facts of equal power. In the same way as Adam Smiths’ mythical free market hand is thought to guarantee a just outcome of wealth among competing individuals, so too one can imagine an invisible hand of international relations, which secures the best common outcome among the states, balancing their power through competition. As a consequence of the constant measurements of relative power, the day came when no one gave in and things got out of hand, resulting in two world wars.
• The second version of world order arose from the rubble as global power was transferred from European powers to America and the Soviet Union. The Cold War, to Kissinger, was a not an example of balance of power, but rather a two-power struggle for world hegemony. In place of realism and colonies, it brought idealism and spheres of influence. US president Woodrow Wilson presented the new ideals in a 1918 speech and put the fourteen points to work during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, which changed the face of Europe. Openness, cooperation, national freedom and collective security were to guide the new world. Clamping down on colonialism, a softer version of subdued states came about, inspired by America’s own interests in all the Americas. The Monroe Doctrine from 1823 is still going strong. It was established to wrestle South and Latin America out of European control. Stating that any European effort to control the “independent” countries on the American continents would be seen as an act of unfriendliness towards the US, it elusively hides its realism in a veil of idealism, as Kissinger is satisfied to point out.
• Another spiral of dynamics emerges in international relations between realism and idealism. Not least in US foreign policy, where the universal nature of political values enforces a crusading strategy towards the world, while more traditional elements of American isolationism and geopolitical facts of security (not having any major threats nearby) work in the opposite direction. Again, each succeeding the other as soon as one effort turned out to be unsuccessful.
• The end of the Cold War brought us to the emergence of the third world order, in which the US superpower is faced with several great powers and the dilemma of not being able to withdraw from, nor completely dominate the rest of the world. In a more complicated multi-polar world, squaring idealism with realism in a balance of powers is ever more the challenge.

It is important to note that even though Kissinger speaks for such a balance, idealism is consistently portrayed by him as the problem, leaving realism to be the solution. His actions on a China détente, his efforts to end the Vietnam War and later his advice on treating post-Soviet Russia as a serious international player with its own national interests and security concerns to be respected, are examples of this. Also, as most clearly seen from an outside point of view, US diplomacy and military action only appears value-based when such is befitting to its underlying short term national self-interests. The long term American strategy to increase its power has been twofold: to expand the sphere of influence and to divide the main rival powers in Europe, Russia and China. And so, Kissinger’s three different world orders do have one thing in common after all: realism is the dominant strategy.

Our world

Acting firmly on the side of realism, Kissinger’s work has been instrumental in routing out value-based policies of idealism, regarding international affairs. In today’s world, ethical foreign policy has given way to Realpolitik. This may be a surprise to many, but as we have seen, a significant part of this approach is to work hard to keep up the pretenses of morality, using values as tactical tools of a realist strategy.

We live in a world where double standards and deception are part and parcel of government function, when it comes to foreign policy. All sides act rationally and in accordance with the philosophy of war and the state of nature among nations. Our leaders are able to go on the news, unquestioned, to condemn rivals for doing exactly what they themselves have just done. Foreign policy is dressed up in moral virtues at the same time as our foreign alliances in reality are embracing whatever despicable state leader, who can be useful in our egotistical push for our national interests. Smaller powers succumb to greater powers, becoming “allies” because they have too, while happily declaring that it is out of free will — the same phony free will which the greater power then uses to justify its encroachment upon the rival’s former sphere of influence, escalating the general threat-level among all. Glorification of values such as free speech coincide with the forced closure of foreign media. Time and time again, innocent populations are fooled by some and bombed by others, being only pawns in the game between great powers.

The social contracts and ethical values that bind us together as individuals within each state, are contradicted by the same governments in the external dealings among states. Leaders behave directly opposite to the moral convictions which brought them to power, when it comes to international matters. And this is only possible because it is hidden from the general public, in accordance with the teachings of war and international relations. Realism is inherently immoral, barring it from public display by the leaders who all need the support of the public.

The sphere of international relations is ruled in line with the law of the jungle, not the propagated “international law” as defined by inadequate international organisations. Might gives right. National interests justify the means. As a result, the logic of war impels us toward conflict. Our constant fear, we erroneously feel, can only be soothed by becoming ever stronger and more of a threat to our fellow monkeys in our jungle. Diplomacy is nothing but war of words. World order is defined by disorder. Military alliances follow their own logic of self-preservation, even in victory. Ever expanding, ever stronger, ever more threatening, they become self-fulfilling prophesies of confrontation. Military industries also serve their own interests in lobbying for weapons to be used and paid for.

Our media play a decisive role in keeping up the necessary pretenses and painting our heroes and villains in the colors most useful, especially in times of war. It is the primary tool in the box for keeping the general population in a state of naivety. Thus control of national media as well as social media is paramount to any leadership, be it direct or indirect, by ways of deception or self-deception, censorship or self-censorship — often it is based on economical levers such as ownership, careers and funding. The individual psychological impetus for getting in line with the national narrative and unknowingly commit to self-deception, is controlling us more than we would like to admit. It is the safe way to go, the road where all becomes more clear and simple, and on which we can move in a single direction of emotion, in support for our values…

The cause of all these dire realities, is the lack of an international structure above the individual states. Just as in Hobbes’ state of nature, only at a higher level. Existing international organisations do nothing to remedy this gap in the evolution of the human species. Either by fault of being too small and in effect functioning just like an individual state in its external dealings, though more powerful. Or by not being powerful enough. (G20, the EU, ASEAN, the African Union and the like, belong to the first category; in the second we find organisations such as the United Nations and all its agencies which, alas, are impeded by the Security Council.) As is stands, international organisations are mere tools of the deceiving realist tactics, just like the use of values.

So why don’t we just stand up and change this? Because it would not be reasonable to do so. The prisoner’s dilemma of game theory can explain why. Imagine two separated gangster prisoners having both been caught at the scene of the crime, who have a choice to make: to blame the crime on the fellow gangster or not. Deciding on the pros and cons, they know that they both get away with a one year sentence in case neither of them betrays the other, while it is two years each if both choose to talk, and zero years for the rat in case he is so lucky that the other prisoner chooses silence, punishing him with the full conviction of three years behind bars. The only rational decision to make is to talk, as it results in less years behind bars, whatever the choice of the other gangster. The dilemma being that both will end up serving two years, when they could have served just one each if they had been less egotistical or less rational. When you cannot know or trust what the other side does, it is therefore the only rational choice to act in accordance with strict self-interest, disregarding what ideological values you may have — bringing both sides down. In other words: without any regulating structure above the individual states, the only rational thing for a government to do is to act immorally and thereby forego the better result for each state. Lack of political structure leads to egotism and worse outcomes for all. This is exactly what happens among individuals in Hobbes’ state of nature and what happened during the Cold War, where both sides paid dearly in terms of resources and wrecked values such as peace and security, in the pursuit of winning the arms race.

A secondary effect of this war logic, is the fact that we have no one to blame for the mess we find ourselves in. Any historical or current person in a position of power answers only to the domain of the job. Doing a good job means taking care of a limited part of humanity, just like it can be outright treason to care for anyone or anything outside those limitations. Again, it is all about the basic structural dynamics which we chose to create or not to create. Any government ruler or military commander must concern himself only with the interests of the job’s narrow domain. No world king was ever crowned and no international organisation ever had the sufficient power over states. When leaders and their advisers deceive the world and order bombs to be dropped, to the detriment of all, they are most often just doing a good job.

Even in the rigid academic debate between idealism and realism within the realm of international relations, there is a limit to our moral judgement. First of all, things soon get endlessly complicated through analytical treatment of moral concepts, leading to a plethora of subdivisions and entanglements. To start with, an idealist could soon view realism as an evil theory, but still judge it to be the right course of action, while the realist could view idealism as good, but still wrong; additionally, long term perspectives could be contrasted with short term perspectives leading to an adjustment of their moral properties, and so on. Secondly, G. E. Moore showed us how any final definition or concluded set of ethical premises are nevertheless always vulnerable to the open-question argument: “…but is it good?” Even natural properties like the immoral ways of realism can be separated from moral properties this way.

Again, our emotional judgement here needs to be modified by reason. Take the crude matrix of strategies of either idealism or realism, intertwined with the options of being honest or dishonest in such enterprise. The honest idealist will gain in terms of ease of conviction, but loose out on the battlefield. Holy warriors and defenders of homelands are in this category. They are likely to put up a fierce resistance, but ending in lost land and/or martyrdom. The honest realist, on the other hand, faces an insurmountable lack of support for the immoral cause, although he has a wider set of tactical means at his disposal due to the freedom to be cruel. Mercenaries belong here. They can work effectively and without scruples, but are unlikely ever to be able to hold a territory and its people on their own. The dishonest idealist faces double the trouble as he is left with both a failing propaganda and the restricted means of fighting. The dishonest realist comes out the clear winner, propped up by a clear and self-deceiving public support, as well as brutal military means. Or as Machiavelli would have said: by being both fox and lion. As a result, it is in this category that we find most governments. It may be the most immoral of all available positions, but it is the winning strategy — the only rational choice. Being naive is the certain road to failure. Naivety must be reserved for the masses under control. And we can have nobody to blame for the warring state of the world; it is purely a problem of political structure.

Some leaders are less rational. Thinking that internal values ought to be external values as well, they commit to them in foreign policy, which leads to a failure in diplomacy or on the battlefield, due to the fact that the rivals are still guided by Realpolitik. In desperation, any available branch of realism is grabbed and used to get afloat again, bringing back deception to hide the evidence. The lesson is learned or another round is launched. Similarly, the classical error of being naive enough to believe one’s own propaganda adds to the spiral dynamics between idealism and realism, which makes governments so unreliable partners. This is especially so in democracies who thrive on a logic of adversity to the rival political block. Sometimes new governments start out very naive and idealistic, believing in the more friendly content of the rival state propaganda. This invariable culminates in a loss of power so considerable that the bitter lesson is learned and an equal swing in the other direction is deemed necessary in order to rectify the situation — in turn leading to a fulfillment of the prophesy inherent in the antagonistic parts of the rival’s propaganda.

Two main stylistic differences of realism can be observed at play: The Eastern approach is more holistic, which involves more emphasis on strategy and tolerance of differences. Long term perspective is preferred along with subtlety, indirection, patience and a stronger appreciation of sacrifice and honor. The teachings of Sun Tzu are better understood and incorporated. Conversely, the Western approach is more dualistic, emphasizing tactics and powerful measures. Short term gains are appreciated along with direct and simple action.

Our future

Four general alternatives for our future are conceivable, of which only one is peaceful and morally sound.

1. Nothing changes and we continue to live in a state of war among nations, in line with raison d’état and the law of the jungle. It may at any one time and place consist in a war of words or of arms, but the most we can hope for is some kind of approximation to the old enlightenment idea of a balance of powers. The trouble is that in order to hope for such, we need to believe in the invisible hand; and the fact of our continuous warfare gives us no reason to do so. (Aspiring superpowers aim for this kind of future, until they themselves might be a superpower.)
2. One power ends up winning it all and establishes full hegemony over the world. This global fulfillment of Emperor Qin’s strategy would create a world-wide political structure, under which civilization could thrive, as it has done within individual states. The predicament is that to get there, immeasurable terror and hardship will be suffered through conflicts all over the planet. (Any current superpower is working toward this alternative.)
3. And most likely, such a World War III will spell the end of humanity, taking with it most of nature in general. It would be a nuclear holocaust. Leaving zero civilization to enjoy the peace that follows. To avoid this, the current superpower would need to win over its rivals without battle. This is where intelligence and diplomacy take center stage, particularly in instigating a foreign coup d’état. But again, as Sun Tzu teaches us and as we see around us, this is an extremely dangerous tactic in that pressing too hard will only make the enemy more aggressive — and they all have a large red button at hand…
4. We see the light and realize our potential in the evolution of mankind, by shedding the illusionary constrictions of narrow-minded individuality and egotism in the establishment of a world-wide political structure. A social contract among nations, for the enhanced benefit of all states and individuals alike.

As we have seen, the main stumbling block here is rationality. As self-interested agents of state or individual, we can only lose out on behaving honestly and altruistically. But that is exactly it: as self-interested agents. What it takes is that all governments comprehend that such agency is an illusion, as it is in the case of individuals. We are nothing without each other, neither in a physical-biological literal sense or in a psychological literary sense. We can never be truly independent and sovereign agents with no strings attached. Everything is relative, i.e. everything relates. Understanding this, we can look back again and use an open-minded concept of individuality and egotism, which in turn will make it rational to behave honestly and altruistically, due to the enhancement of our — in the wider sense — own situation by way of the best common good.

This actually happened in early tribal societies, where it was obvious that the single person could never be an independent entity. Trusting each other was a choice you had to make, even a rational one, generating a better outcome than in the prisoner’s dilemma (although in fact they all grew up with this view of the world and never had to make the conscious choice, but we have smaller minds and must think it through this way). Those tribes then spread to become states through an awful lot of war and pain, unifying smaller groups into larger ones.

Now the challenge is to take the last big step while avoiding nuclear holocaust or indeed any kind of war or other immoral terror of whole populations. For undertakings like this, trust needs to be established top-down from the most powerful state and down through the various levels of lesser powerful governments. In narrow-minded terms, this involves relinquishing most sovereignty by those who currently enjoy most power over others. What they gain, is an actual fulfillment of the values contained in their own propaganda. Values such as security can be achieved only in its indivisible form, where all share the same level of security, and by way of being friendly, rather than threatening toward each other (more missiles on one side of the border or stronger monkeys in the jungle, only serve to create more insecurity among all involved).

Our task is exceedingly difficult, but the alternatives are far, far worse. On the bright side, the only tactics we need in this endeavor are to be trusting, open-minded, honest and — not least — truly value-based.